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FIFTH AMENDMENT
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)
In Michigan v. Tucker,' the United States
Supreme Court held that the testimony of a
witness whose identity was revealed to the po-
lice during a custodial interrogation of the de-
fendant conducted prior to the decision in Mi-
randa v. Arizona2 need not be excluded at trial
even though the defendant was not apprised of
his full Miranda warnings.5
Respondent was arrested for rape and
brought to the police station for questioning.
Before the actual interrogation began, the po-
lice told him of his right to remain silent, his
right to counsel, and that anything he said
could be used against him in a court of law.4
1417 U.S. 433 (1974).
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Each defendant, while in
police custody, was questioned by the authorities in
an interrogation isolated from the outside world.
None of the defendants was given a full and effec-
tive warning of his constitutional rights prior to
being questioned. All made incriminating state-
ments.
3 The Court set out the Miranda warnings in its
holding, as follows:
[W]e hold that when an individual is taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom by the authorities in any significant way
and is subjected to questioning, the privilege
against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Pro-
cedural safeguards must be employed to pro-
tect the privilege, and unless other fully effec-
tive means are adopted to notify the person of
his right of silence and to assure that the
exercise of the right will be scrupulously hon-
ored, the following measures are required. (1)
He must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, (2)
that anything he says can be used against him
in a court of law, (3) that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, and (4) that if
he cannot afford an attorney one will be ap-
pointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires. Opportunity to exercise these
rights must be afforded him throughout the
interrogation. After such warnings have been
given, and such opportunity afforded him, the
individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer ques-
tions or make a statement. But unless and
until such warnings and waiver are demon-
strated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be
used against him.
Id. at 478-79 (numerals added).
4 The warnings issued complied fully with the
constitutional standards required by Escobedo v.
The police failed, however, to advise respond-
ent that he would be provided with a lawyer
free of charge if he was indigent. After reply-
ing that he understood his rights and that he
did not want a lawyer, the respondent offered
the name of an alibi witness (Henderson) in
response to police questioning about his activi-
ties on the night of the rape. But, when police
contacted Henderson his statements seriously
incriminated the respondent.5
Before respondent's trial commenced, Mi-
randa v. Arizona6 and Johnson v. New Jersef
were decided. The holding in Johnson made
Miranda applicable to all defendants whose
trials began after the decision in Miranda.
Relying upon this, respondent made a pretrial
motion to exclude both his testimony and that
of Henderson. Respondents appointed counsel
argued that Henderson's testimony must be ex-
cluded because respondent had disclosed Hen-
derson's identity without having received full
Miranda warnings. The trial court rejected
this argument and admitted Henderson's testi-
mony, although respondent's statements were
excluded in accordance with Miranda. Re-
spondent was convicted, and the conviction
was affirmed by both the Michigan court of
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). In Escobedo, the de-
fendant had been taken into police custody for
questioning about a murder. During the question-
ing, the police refused to permit the defendant to
see his lawyer who was waiting outside. The de-
fendant eventually made incriminating admissions.
In reversing his conviction, the Supreme Court
held that the failure of the police to allow the de-
fendant to see his lawyer upon request constituted
a denial of assistance of counsel in violation of the
sixth and fourteenth amendments. The police in
Tucker did inform the defendant of his right to
have an attorney present if he so desired.
5 Respondent had told the police that he had
been with Henderson that night, but Henderson
said respondent had left early. Henderson also told
police that the following day he asked respondent
about the scratches on his face and respondent told
him that he had received them from a "widow
woman" down the street (the victim was an un-
married woman living alone in respondent's neigh-
borhood).6 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
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appeals s and by the Michigan supreme court."
Respondent then obtained habeas corpus re-
lief in federal district court 0 which held that
evidence derived from a statement taken in vi-
olation of Miranda was inadmissible. The dis-
trict court reasoned that since the respondent
had not received his full Miranda warnings
and the police had stipulated that Henderson's
identity was learned only through respondent's
answers, application of the exclusionary rule
was necessary to protect respondent's fifth
amendment right against compulsory self-in-
crimination. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed."
In an eight-to-one decision, the Supreme
Court reversed, with Mr. Justice Rehnquist
speaking for the majority.12 On appeal re-
spondent argued that the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination as articulated in
Miranda mandated the exclusion at trial of all
evidence derived solely from statements made
without full Miranda warnings.' 3 The Court
avoided a decision on this broad argument, but
held that the fifth amendment does not require
derivative evidence to be excluded even if ob-
tained in an interrogation made without full
Miranda warnings. The holding was limited,
however, to statements taken during pre-Mi-
randa interrogations.
The majority opinion employed a two-step
analysis. First, the Court considered whether
or not the respondent's right against compul-
sory self-incrimination had been directly
abridged by the police. It concluded that the po-
lice conduct had only violated the prophylactic
rules developed to protect that right. Second, it
considered whether Henderson's testimony had
to be excluded and concluded that it did not.
8 19 Mich. App. 320, 172 N.W2d 712 (1969).
The court held that Miranda did not apply to de-
rivative evidence obtained before Miranda and ap-
parently legal at that time, even if used after Mi-
randa.
9 385 Mich. 594, 189 N.W.2d 290 (1971). The
supreme court adopted the appellate court's opinion
as its own.
20 352 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
"480 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1973), affirmed with-
out an opinion.
'2 Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice
Burger, and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and
Powell.
"3 Respondent's argument is essentially the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, used to ex-
clude from trial evidence derived from illegally ob-
tained evidence. See Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471 (1963).
The majority initially examined the scope of
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimi-
nation. Looking at the historical circumstances
which gave rise to the privilege, the Court
echoed prior cases by saying that the privilege
"was aimed at a far reaching evil-a recurrence
of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber, even
if not in their stark brutality." "4 Although the
Constitution itself speaks of the applicability of
the privilege only in criminal cases,'15 the
Court asserted that "[w]here there has been
genuine compulsion of testimony, the right has
been given broad scope." 16 The rationale for
those broad holdings, the Court stated, was a
concern for protecting the right at an early
stage of the adversary proceedings so that its
invocation would not be futile at a later stage.
Recognizing the critical nature of custodial
questioning, Miranda extended the privilege to
police interrogations. To supplement and pro-
tect the privilege against compulsory self-in-
crimination during police interrogation, the
Court provided a set of "prophylactic rules." '7
To enforce the Miranda warnings, the Court
also supplied an exclusionary rule as a sanc-
tion for disregarding them.""
.4 417 U.S. at 440, quoting from Ullman v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422, 428 (1956).
15 "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to -be a witness against himself."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The fifth amendment was
made applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
16 417 U.S. at 440. For examples of the broad
scope of the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination the Court cited several cases. See In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (to juvenile proceed-
ings) ; Watkins v. United States 354 U.S. 178
(1957) (to congressional investigations) ; McCarthy
v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (during civil pro-
ceedings) ; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892) (the privilege is applicable before a
grand jury).
17 417 U.S. at 439. This phrase was also used by
the Court in Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53(1973), and by Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclu-
sionary Ride, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1030 (1974).
1s If the warnings are considered not to be of
constitutional stature, then the exclusionary rule
would be necessary to enforce them. However, if
the warnings are a part and parcel of the fifth
amendment, then no exclusionary rule should be
necessary to implement them. This is because the
fifth amendment, by its own terms, demands com-
pelled statements not be admitted. In this sense,
the fifth amendment differs from the fourth
amendment which does not deal directly with the
exclusion of illegally seized evidence at trial, and
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After re-examining the facts of the case, the
Court determined that the police interrogation
was dramatically unlike the historical practices
at which the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination was aimed.19 Also, respond-
ent's statements were not "involuntary" as tra-
ditionally defined by the Supreme Court.' 0 In
light of those findings, the majority concluded
that there was no genuine compulsion, and
consequently no real infringement of respond-
ent's fifth amendment rights in spite of the
technical Miranda infraction. It said:
A comparison of the facts in this case with
the historical circumstances underlying the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination
strongly indicates that the police conduct here
did not deprive respondent of his privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination as such,
but rather failed to make available to him the
full measure of procedural safeguards associ-
ated with that right since Miranda.
1
Having characterized the case as one of a
violation of the Miranda rules without an
abridgment of the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination, the Court then distinguished
the instant case from Wong Sun v. United
States22 which held that the fruits of a police
search which actually infringed upon the de-
must be supplemented by an exclusionary rule. See
Note, Admissibility of Unlawfully Obtained State-
nent for Impeachment Purposes, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 44, 49-50 (1971).
19 See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-In-
crimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949). But see 8
J. WIGIORE, EViDENcE 2251 (McNaughton rev.
1961) (Hereinafter cited as WIGMORE). It is curious
to note that while Justice Rehnquist cites Wigmore
in support of his assertion, Wigmore himself criti-
cized the use of the Star Chamber example to ex-
plain the privilege against self-incrimination's his-
tory by saying "[t]he naked association of
compulsory self-incrimination with the unpopular
Star Chamber produces no valid conclusion." WIG-
AioRE, at 312, n.5. Wigmore thought that not
everything about the Star Chamber was bad, and
that it had been very efficient at times.
Justice Rehnquist's treatment of history is trun-
cated at best. The Court in Miranda traced the
privilege's history to contemporary times and said
that the privilege had transcended itsorigins. 384
U.S. at 460. The Court perceived the privilege to
be a substantive right protecting the inviolability of
the individual from governmental intrusion, forcing
the government in the accusatorial system to con-
vict the individual with evidence secured by its
own efforts. Id.
20 See notes 48-57 and accompanying text infra.
"1417 U.S. at 444.
22 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
fendant's fourth amendment rights had to be
suppressed, the difference between the two
cases being the gravity of the police illegality.
Finding no other possible controlling prece-
dents,2" the Court then discussed the issue of
the admissibility of Henderson's testimony as a
matter of principle.
Starting from the premise that any sanction
imposed upon police (and prosecuting attor-
neys) must serve a valid and useful purpose,
the Court first considered the primary ration-
ale offered in support of the fourth amendment
exclusionary rule: deterrence.' 4  The Court
23 This assertion constituted the point of depar-
ture for Justice Brennan in his separate opinion.
He recognized the possibility that Miranda itself
might have resolved the "fruits" question. There
are, however, only a few references in that opinion
which contemplate that position. First, there is the
declaration of the sanction for disregarding the re-
quired warnings, or for failing to procure a know-
ing and intelligent waiver of rights: "But unless
and until such warnings and waiver are demon-
strated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence ob-
tained as a result of interrogation can be used
against [the defendant]." 384 U.S. at 479. There is
also language in one of the dissents: "The Court
further holds that failure to follow the new proce-
dures requires inexorably the exclusion [at trial]
of any statements by the accused, as well as the
fruits thereof." Id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, observed
that all the defendants in Miranda sought only to
exclude their own statements, and therefore con-
cluded that the "fruits" question remained open.
This position is supported by a portion of Justice
White's dissent in that case: "Today's decision
leaves open such questions as ... whether non-
testimonial evidence introduced at trial is the fruit
of statements made during a prohibited interroga-
tion .... "Id. at 545 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist's position is stronger. Since
none of the Miranda defendants argued for the ex-
clusion of fruits, the broad language used by the
majority in Miranda must be construed as dicta.
The commentators seem to be in agreement with
the Tucker majority. See George, The Fruits of
Miranda: Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 39 U.
CoLo. L. Rav. 478 (1967).
24The exclusionary rule was introduced in
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), and
applied to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961).
While admittedly "deterrence" is a major pur-
pose underlying the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule, others have been mentioned. Justice
Brennan, dissenting in a recent search and seizure
case, said:
The exclusionary rule, if not perfect, accom-
plished the twin goals of enabling the judici-
ary to avoid the taint of partnership in official
lawlessness and of assuring the people-all po-
tential victims of unlawful government conduct
-that the government would not profit from
its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk
[Vol. 65
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stated that "[t]he rule's prime purpose is to
deter future unlawful police conduct . . . .
[and] to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effective available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it." 25 By
analogy, the Court applied the deterrence ra-
tionale to the fifth amendment exclusionary
rule accompanying the privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination. The Court then as-
serted that the deterrence rationale presup-
poses willful or negligent police conduct. But,
where the police have acted in good faith, and
not merely in ignorance of constitutional pro-
tections, the rational foundation for the rule
disappears and there would be no deterrent ef-
fect. Since the police in the instant case had
issued the warnings prior to M1firanda and in
accordance with Escobedo v. Illinois,2 6 the
Court concluded that it would serve no valid
or useful purpose to exclude Henderson's testi-
mony on this ground.
The Court also disposed of a second justifi-
cation for the fifth amendment exclusionary
rule: the untrustworthiness of the evidence
obtained. 2 7 Conceding that coerced confessions
cannot serve to advance the ends of justice
and rehabilitation, the majority reiterated its
finding of lack of compulsion. Also, the Court
noted that it was Henderson's testimony which
was challenged, and that he was under no cus-
todial pressures. Additionally, his testimony
was subjected to the normal impeachment
process on cross-examination. Therefore, there
was no reason to believe that Henderson's tes-
timony was untrustworthy.
of seriously undermining popular trust in gov-
ernment.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357
(1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court, however, discounted the "imperative
of judicial integrity" as an assimilation of the spe-
cific rationales mentioned in the text. 417 U.S. at
450 n. 25.25 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347
(1974).
26 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
2
7 The theory underlying this rationale is that
an involuntary confession should be excluded be-
cause the suspect is likely to agree to anything in
order to get his tormenters to cease. The courts
want to hear no evidence that is probably unreli-
able because it interferes with the integrity of the
fact-finding process. See, e.g., Inbau, Restrictions
in the Law of Interrogation and Confessions, 52
Nw. U.L. REv. 77, 78 (1957) ; Inbau, Legal Pit-falls to Avoid in Criminal Interrogation, 40 J.
CUm. L.C. & P.S. 211, 212 (1949).
Finally, the Court disposed of a third justifi-
cation for the fifth amendment exclusionary
rule: the adversary system requires "the gov-
ernment in its contest with the individual to
shoulder the entire load." 28 First voicing skep-
ticism as to whether this third justification was
really independent of the other two, the Court
then rejected respondent's contention by stat-
ing that the government, within constitutional
limitations, is not prohibited from requiring
the defendant to work for the state.2 9 It felt
that the use of a witness discovered as a result
of a defendant's "voluntary" statement did not
subvert the adversary system.
The Court also placed considerable emphasis
on the strong interest in presenting all avail-
able trustworthy evidence to the trier of fact. It
relied heavily on Harris v. New York.30 In
Harris, the defendant was charged with selling
heroin to an undercover agent on two separate
occasions. While testifying on his own behalf,
the defendant denied knowledge of the first
transaction, and claimed that he had sold the
officer only baking soda in the second. The
prosecutor was allowed to impeach the defend-
ant's credibility by reading to the jury portions
of a contradictory statement which the defend-
ant had "voluntarily" made immediately after
his arrest. The statement had been taken in vi-
olation of Miranda, and was excluded from the
prosecutor's case-in-chief. On appeal, the Su-
preme Court held that defendant's statements
taken in violation of Miranda could be used to
impeach his direct testimony at trial. Chief
28 WIGMORE, supra note 19, at 317.
29 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973)
(requiring a potential defendant to submit a voice
exemplar to a grand jury violates no constitutional
right). Schmerber v.' California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966) (taking of a blood sample from an unwill-
ing suspect violates no constitutional right). These
cases illustrate a limitation on the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination; identifiable physical
characteristics are not protected by the fifth
amendment. However, these cases have no appli-
cability to Tucker since identifiable physical char-
acteristics are not at issue.
s401 U.S. 222 (1971). Legal commentators
agree that Harris constituted the first judicial en-
croachment upon Miranda. See, e.g., Dershowitz &
Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Obser-
vations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging
Nixon Majority, 80 YALE, L.J. 1198 (1971) ; Note,
Harris v. New York: The Retreat from Miranda,
32 LA. L. REv. 650 (1972) ; Note, Harris v. New




Justice Burger, writing for the majority, rea-
soned that the interest of preventing perjury
and the need to assess defendant's credibility
eclipsed the slight possibility that the police
would be encouraged to forego the Miranda
warnings. Applying the reasoning of Harris to
Tucker, the Court concluded that the prosecu-
tion could make some use of defendant's state-
ments and refused to exclude Henderson's tes-
timony.
Justice Brennan wrote a separate opinion,
concurring in the judgment of the Court. 31 He
argued that Johnson v. New Jersey should be
limited to only those cases in which the direct
statements of an accused made during a pre-
Miranda interrogation were introduced at his
post-Miranda trial. Alternatively Justice Bren-
nan urged that if Miranda was at all applicable
to derivative evidence obtained from statements
made without proper warnings having been is-
sued,32 it should be limited to fruits obtained
as a result of post-Miranda interrogations.
Justice Brennan reasoned that the application of
a broad Miranda reading (including a prohibi-
tion on the use of fruits) to Tucker would place
a substantial burden upon police officers to
gather "untainted" evidence because of their
justified reliance on the prior constitutional re-
quirements, and would not measurably increase
the "integrity of the fact-finding process." 33
Moreover, Justice Brennan observed, the ele-
ment of unreliability is of less importance when
the admissibility of fruits is at issue.
Justice White also wrote a separate opinion
limiting his concurrence with the judgment of
the Court. First he reiterated his view that
Miranda was "ill-conceived and without war-
rant in the Constitution." 34 Then after agree-
ing with the majority that there were no con-
trolling precedents on the issue of fruits, he
argued that Miranda should not be extended to
bar the testimony of witnesses even if they
were identified solely through admissions them-
selves excludable under Miranda. He reasoned
that any debatable deterrent benefit to be
gained by excluding such testimony was "out-
weighed by the advantages of having relevant
31 Justice Brennan was joined by Justice Mar-
shall.
3 2 See note 23 supra.
33 417 U.S. at 458.
34 Id. at 460 (White, J., concurring).
and probative testimony, not obtained by actual
coercion, available at criminal trials to aid in
the pursuit of truth." 35 He then qualified his
position by suggesting that a different result
might be reached if the fruits were derived
from an involuntary confession.
Justice Douglas was the lone dissenter. His
opinion was premised on a different reading of
Miranda, where he was in the majority. Rely-
ing on an expansive interpretation of that case,
he viewed the failure of the police to advise
the indigent respondent of his right to a
count-appointed counsel as an abridgment of
respondent's fifth amendment right against
compulsory self-incrimination 6 Justice Douglas
then argued for the exclusion of Henderson's
testimony on the basis of a simple "fruit of the
poisonous tree" analysis.3 7 Seizing upon the
police admission that the identity of the wit-
ness was learned only through the illegal inter-
rogation, Justice Douglas concluded that the
testimony had to be excluded.
Finally, Justice Douglas voiced his objections
to the prospective application of Miranda, say-
ing: "I disagree, as I disagreed in Johnson,
that any defendant can be deprived of the full
protection of the Fifth Amendment, as the Court
has construed it in Miranda, based upon an arbi-
trary reference to the date of his interrogation
or his trial." 38 Noting -that Tucker was inter-
rogated more than three years after Miranda
was interrogated, he considered the denial of
35 Id. at 461 (White, J., concurring).
31 The majority in Miranda attached consider-
ably more importance to the warning's absence
than did Justice Rehnquist. Regarding the practical
significance of the warning, it said:
Without this additional warning, the admoni-
tion of the right to consult with counsel would
often be understood as meaning only that he
can consult with a lawyer if he has one or
has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a
right to counsel would be hollow if not
couched in terms that would convey to the in-
digent-the person most often subjected to in-
terrogation-the knowledge that he too has a
right to have counsel present. As with the
warning of the right to remain silent and of
the general right to counsel, only by effective
and express explanation to the indigent of this
right can there be assurance that he was truly
in a position to exercise it.
384 U.S. at 473.
37 See note 13 supra.
38 417 U.S. at 464 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Miranda to Tucker as "grossly invidious
discrimination." 39
The most apparent and immediate effect of
Michigan v. Tucker is the further erosion of
the Miranda rule.40 In cases subsequent to
M1iranda,41 the courts viewed Miranda as dic-
tating a constitutionally required rule of exclu-
sion for confessions or admissions obtained
without the required warnings having been
given prior to interrogation. The rationale of-
fered was that police practices made the inter-
rogation so inherently coercive 42 that the
warnings were constitutionally necessary to
protect the privilege and to dispel the atmos-
phere of coerciveness. If the warnings were
not issued, then anything the defendant said
was held ipso facto not to be truly voluntary,
and hence "compelled" within the meaning of
the fifth amendment. It is the equation between
"a failure to warn" and "compulsion" which
Tucker has explicitly altered by reducing the
warnings to merely prophylactic rules, and by
redefining what constitutes compelled testimony.
First, the Court diluted the warnings by
narrowly construing Miranda. In support of its
interpretation, the majority cited language in-
39 Id. at 465 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40 See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
41E.g., United States v. Jeffrey, 473 F.2d 268(9th Cir. 1973) (statements taken at a custodial
interrogation not prefaced by Miranda warnings
held inadmissible) ; Brown v. Beto, 468 F.2d 1284
(5th Cir. 1972) (incriminating admissions made
during a search held inadmissible because no Mi-
randa warnings had been given) ; United States v.
Cassell, 452 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1971) (both in-
.criminating statements and a handwriting exem-
plar declared inadmissible because taken in
-violation of Mirandt) ; United States v. Bekowies,
432 F.2d 8 (9th Cir. 1970) (statements taken from
defendant by federal agents searching his apart-
ment for a fugitive held inadmissible because the
Miranda warnings had not been given); United
States v. Lackey, 413 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1969)(interview conducted without Miranda warnings
being given produced inadmissible statements);
United States v. Kucinich, 404 F.2d 262, 266 (6th
Cir. 1968) ("The gist of Miranda is that any
statement of an accused while in custody is ipso
facto involuntary unless he has been properly
warned."); Wado v. Mancusi, 358 F. Supp. 103
(W.D.N.Y. 1973) (incriminating statements held
inadmissible when made without receiving Miranda
warnings even though defendant was in custody at
the time for an entirely different crime). This list
comprises only a small sample of the dozens of de-
cisions which have applied Miranda as a per se
constitutional rule.
42 384 U.S. at 445-58.
dicating that the Court in Miranda felt that
the Constitution did not require any specific
solutions to the problems raised by police in-
terrogations, and that "suggested safeguards
were not intended to create a constitutional
straightjacket . . . . ",43 It was this interpreta-
tion which met with opposition from Justice
Douglas. He took a much broader view, and
cited language in support of his position. In the
Miranda opinion he found that the warnings
were "fundamental with respect to the Fifth
Amendment privilege,"' 4 4 and that they, or "other
fully effective means" 45 of warning, had to be
given. Justice Douglas found no equivalent warn-
ings given in Tucker,46 so he concluded, again
in language from Miranda, that respondent's
statements were "obtained under circumstances
that did not meet the constitutional standards
for the protection of the privilege [against
self-incrimination]."4
Next, the majority defined the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination to encom-
pass only "genuinely compelled" statements.
Implicit in the opinion is the argument that if
there is no genuine compulsion, the scope of
the privilege should be closely circumscribed.
There is no explicit definition given for what
constitutes "genuine" compulsion other than
occasional references to the Star Chamber and
the Inquisition, but one can be inferred from
the Court's analysis. In reviewing the facts,
the Court determined that the respondent had
not been genuinely compelled when he made
his admissions in the police station.48 In other
words, his statements were truly voluntary in
light of the totality of circumstances. On the
basis of the peculiar factual situation presented
to the Court, i.e., the police were acting in
good faith when giving the incorrect warnings,
the Court clearly abandoned Miranda for the
43 Id. at 467.
44 Id. at 476.
45 Id. at 579.
46 Of course, the police could not have antici-
pated Miranda.
47 384 U.S. at 491.
48 The respondent had been asked whether he
understood the charges against him, warned of his
right to remain silent, told that anything he said
could be used against him, and asked whether he
wanted an attorney. From this the majority con-
cluded that respondent's statements were not
coerced from him because the interrogation was




moment in favor of the much maligned "volun-
tariness" test.
49
If it were certain that this holding would be
confined to its facts, then the discredited "vol-
untariness" test would remain a faint specter
in the night. But, the tenor of the majority
opinion and Justice White's concurring opinion
suggests a return to this test which was discarded
in Miranda as being inadequate to preserve the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination.
A reversion to the "voluntariness" test, based
upon the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, would not be welcomed. The appli-
cation of the "voluntariness" test was a func-
tion of the subjective perceptions of each
judge. Whether, in light of the "totality of the
circumstances," 50 the particular conduct of the
police amounted to coercion was generally con-
trolled by two factors: (1) the personal char-
acteristics of the defendant 51 and (2) the pres-
sures applied by the police during
interrogation.52 The first factor necessarily
concerned the vagaries of the human mind,
and the second often devolved into a "swearing
contest" between the defendant and the police
over what took place in an interrogation room
isolated from the court.5
3
49 The "voluntariness" test has been a fertile
ground for legal criticism. For an expanded dis-
cussion of the arguments which appear in the test,
see generally, Kamisar, A Dissent from the Mi-
randa Dissents: Some Comments on the "New"
Fifth Amendment and the old "Voluntariness"
Test, 65 Mica. L. REv. 59 (1966); Miller & Kes-
sel, The Confession Confusion, 49 MARQ. L. REv.
715 (1966) ; Comment, The Coerced Confessions
Cases in Search of a Rationale, 31 U. Cm. L.
REV. 313 (1964).
5o Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957).
51 The question is "whether the defendant's will
was overborne at the time he confessed." Haynes
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 504, 513 (1963). If the
defendant's will is "overborne," then an involun-
tary state of mind exists. An involuntary state of
mind is produced when the pressures exerted to
extract a confession surpass the resistance of a
person confessing. The ability of a person to resist
is a function of age, intelligence, etc.52 See Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Crimi-
nal Confessions Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court,
19 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 35, 39-43 (1962).
53 The defendant usually lost out in a "swearing
contest" because of the superior credibility of the
police in the eyes of the trial court. This aspect of
the "voluntariness" test prompted Kamisar to say
that "[o]nly one with an extravagant faith in the
actual operation of the 'totality of the circum-
stances' test could fail to see that the safeguards
provided by the old test were largely 'illusory.'"
Kamisar, supra note 49, at 62.
The primary difficulty with the "voluntari-
ness" test was its inability to provide consist-
ent guidelines to remove excessive subjectivity.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Miranda, insisted
that the pre-Miranda cases illustrated "a work-
able and effective means of dealing with
confessions in a judicial manner" 54 and that
"the court has developed an elaborate, sophisti-
cated, and sensitive approach to admissibility." s5
But, an excessively sensitive approach ceases to
have meaningful predictive value.5 6
Part of the problem was caused by the Su-
preme Court's own failure to support the "vol-
untariness" test with a single rationale. Some
commentators 57 have argued that the Court ex-
cluded confessions because they were
untrustworthy. s However, these decisions con-
flict with those cases where the reliability of
the excluded confession was demonstrated. 59
Others have argued that the Court excluded
confessions to deter improper police conduct.60
But, if the purpose of excluding coerced con-
fessions under the "voluntariness" test was to-
deter improper police conduct, then there
should have been some definite guidelines for
the police to follow. Justice Clark, himself a
proponent of the "voluntariness" test, said of
the deterrence rationale: "In a case-by-case ap-
proach, the conduct of local police is not
54 384 U.S. at 506 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting).5
6See Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568
1961); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963). In both cases the Court held the confes-
sion to have been involuntarily given, but there was-
a vigorous dissent in each case. Certainly the dis-
sents challenge the workability of Justice Harlan's
"voluntariness" test.
57 See McCormick, The Scope of Privilege in
the Law of Evidence, 16 Tx. L. Rxv. 447, 452-53
(1938) ; Mueller, The Law Relating to Police In-
terrogation Privileges and Limitations, 52 J. CRIm.
L.C. & P.S. 2 (1961).
58 E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278.
(1936) (a confession was obtained by torture).
59 See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503, 518 (1963) ("substantial independent evidence
tending to demonstrate the guilt"); Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960) ("other evi-
dence establishes guilt or corroborates the confes-
sion").
10 See, e.g., Allen, Due Process and State Crim-
inal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. REv.
16, 23-25 (1953) ; Meltzer, Involuntary
Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility Be-
tween Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 317,
343-44 (1954); Way, The Supreme Court and
State Coerced Confessions, 12 J. PUB. L. 53, 55
(1963).
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shaped; unpredictable reversals on dissimilar
fact situations are not likely to curb the zeal of
the [police and prosecutors]...." '6 In the ab-
sence of the formulation of some new test of
"voluntariness," the Tucker decision signals a
return to these confusions of the old "voluntar-
iness" test.
In the instant case the defendant's own
statements were excluded, so it is arguable that
the precedential value of this decision is
strictly limited to testimonial fruits. But,
since the Court held that the defendant's fifth
amendment rights had not been violated, there
is no constitutional reason for excluding a de-
fendant's own admissions in future cases. As a
probable consequence of Tucker, cases analo-
gous to previously decided cases such as Com-
monwealth v. Singleton 62 and Biggerstaff v.
State63 will be decided contrarily. In Singleton,
the police told the defendant the proper Mi-
randa warnings except that he was advised
that anything he said could be used "for or
against" him. The entire confession was
stricken as violative of Miranda. In Bigger-
staff, the defendant had been given his warn-
ings, but had been told he was entitled to a
lawyer "at any time." The court held the
warning to be insufficient to inform the de-
fendant of his right to counsel during ques-
tioning. Thus, prosecutors will now cite Tucker
for the proposition that a defendant, interro-
gated in violation of Miranda, who otherwise
makes a voluntary statement, should not be ac-
corded the benefits of the exclusionary rule to
block the use of an incriminating statement in
the state's case-in-chief.
The most disturbing aspect of Tucker is the
emphasis the majority opinion and two concur-
ring opinions place on the "pursuit of truth"
goal of a trial. All three opinions mention the
reliability of Henderson's testimony as the crit-
ical factor in admitting it. However, to admit
Henderson's testimony on the basis of its relia-
bility and ignore its source loses sight of the
fundamentally accusatory nature of our legal
system. The essential mainstay of the accusa-
torial system is the privilege against compul-
61 Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138 (1954)
(Clark, J., concurring).
62 439 Pa. 185, 266 A.2d 753 (1970).
63491 P.2d 345 (Okla. Crim. 1971).
sory self-incrimination.- In Tehan v. Shott6
the Court said that "the basic purposes that lie
behind the privilege do not relate to protecting
the innocent from conviction... "66 and that
the privilege ". . . is not an adjunct to the as-
certainment of truth." 67 It exists not to protect
the innocent but those who wish to rely on the
presumption of innocence.68 The privilege,
then, is a ground rule in the adversary system
forcing "the government in its contest with the
individual to shoulder the entire load." 69
When the privilege or its exclusionary rule is
invoked, police misconduct or the reliability of
the information obtained is not at issue. The
central focus is on the procedural fairness to
that particular defendant. So, invoking the Mi-
randa rule to protect a privilege which is "not
an adjunct to the ascertainment of truth" ob-
viously conflicts with the majority's "pursuit of
truth." The majority resolves the conflict by
discounting any subversion of the adversary
system.70 But, to allow Henderson's testimony
would arguably defeat the vitality of Miranda
and deprive the defendant of one of his defen-
ses at trial. If the police are assured that there
will be no sanction imposed upon their miscon-
duct, they may be encouraged to disregard the
Miranda warnings more frequently and fla-
grantly.
The decision in Tucker still leaves the crim-
inal lawyer without a definitive ruling on the
admissibility of derivative evidence obtained by
police from a post-Miranda interrogation. By
embracing a non-constitutional interpretation
of Miranda, the Court has avoided the complex
problems plaguing lower courts on this issue.
The tendency in the cases has been to vote for
exclusion of third party testimony when the
primary illegality arose under the fourth
64 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 231
(1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65 382 U.S. 406 (1966) (holding that Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), prohibiting prose-
cutors and judges from commenting negatively on
the defendant's failure to testify in a state criminal
trial, was only prospective).
66 382 U.S. at 415.
67 Id. at 416.
68 See Schaefer, Police Interrogation and the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 61 Nw. U.L.
RZv. 506 (1966).
69 WGMtoRE, supra note 19, at 317.
70 417 U.S. at 450.
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amendment,7 1 but to admit it otherwise.72 Prior
to Tucker, however, the courts were forced to
rationally distinguish their holdings from the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine of Sil-
verthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. United States,
73
which held that derivative evidence could not
be used at all unless obtained from an inde-
pendent source. Rather than require the police
to show that the witness' identity or testimony
in fact came from an independent source, a
"personality" test was employed: a witness'
testimony is not to be excluded automatically
even if derived from a tainted source because,
unlike physical evidence, the "attributes of will,
perception, memory, and volition" 74 combine
to make his expected statement unpredictable,
and therefore not directly derived from the
primary illegality. Although the Court in
Tucker was certainly aware of this test,7 5 it
chose instead to base its holding on the inde-
pendent reliability of Henderson's testimony.
That may have been a prudent decision on the
Court's part for the "personality" test seems
71 Smith v. United States, 344 F.2d 545 (D.C.
Cir. 1965), after prior remand, 355 F.2d 270 (D.C.
Cir. 1964) (witnesses discovered from leads re-
sulting from an illegal search were not permitted
to testify) ; People v. Albea, 2 Ill. 2d 317, 118
N.E.2d 277 (1954) (exclusion of testimony of a
witness discovered after police illegally entered a
doctor's office) ; People v. Martin, 382 Ill. 192, 46
N.E.2d 997 (1942) (exclusion of a witness discov-
ered through the unlawful seizure and examination
of private papers).
72 Smith & Bowden v. United States, 324 F.2d
879 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 954
(1964) (the testimony of a witness whose identity
was learned only through a confession violating
the McNabb-Mallory rule was not excluded).
Contra, United States v. Cassell, 452 F.2d 533
(7th Cir. 1971) (a handwriting exemplar obtained
as a result of an interview conducted in violation
of Miranda was excluded at trial). A useful dis-
tinction can be drawn between these cases and
those cited in note 71 mipra: A violation of the
fourth amendment is more likely to lead to the ex-
clusion of derivative evidence than a violation of
either Miranda or McNabb-Mallory. Even before
Tucker, there was a judicial unwillingness to rec-
ognize either of these rules as being of truly fifth
amendment stature. Therefore, the protection of
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine extends
further where fundamental rights, such as the pro-
hibition against unreasonable searches and seizures,
are at stake.
73 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
74 324 F.2d at 881.
75 Mr. Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion
in Smith & Bowden v. United States, 324 F.2d 879
(D.C. Cir. 1963).
unworkable. 76 Establishing or breaking a cau-
sal link between the original tainted evidence
and the third party's ultimate testimony by
probing the human mind for exertions of "free
will" is probably too elusive a task for a court
to effectively handle. Its use generally would
result in confusion and frustration for both
courts and police.
However, it is now likely that when the Su-
preme Court is unavoidably confronted with
the broad "fruits" question, it will resolve the
issue in favor of admission, except where the
evidence was derived from an involuntary con-
fession. In the absence of a violation of the
fifth amendment, society's interest in present-
ing the trier of fact with all relevant and trust-
worthy evidence will outweigh the purposes
served by excluding it. This is the thrust of Jus-
tice White's concurrence in Tucker, and is a
balancing test which will probably be adopted
in the future. 7
7
In conclusion, Jlichigan v. Tucker repre-
sents a retreat from Miranda. Following Har-
ris, Tucker has encroached upon the broad
prohibitions issued in Miranda against the use
of a defendant's inadmissible statements for
any purpose. This has been accomplished by
the destruction of the equation between a fail-
ure to advise the defendant of his constitu-
tional rights prior to the interrogation and the
ipso facto involuntariness of anything the de-
fendant says during the interrogation. The
76 See Ruffin, Out o a Limb of the Poisonons
Tree: The Tainted Witness, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
32 (1967). Ruffin offers a good general discussion
of the entire subject of "tainted witnesses."
77 The Supreme Court in Tucker may be laying
the foundation for a general alteration of the prin-
ciples governing exclusionary rules because this
logic applies equally well by analogy to search and
seizure cases. It suggests a definite retreat from a
liberal use of the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule to a more limited one, confined to cases
where the police have acted outrageously. Under
such an interpretation, the exclusion of evidence in
cases of technical police error, such as a defective
warrant, would fail to have any deterrent effect. If
the sanction is ineffective, then there is no valid
purpose served in denying admission of the evi-
dence. This reasoning, however, ignores the other
rationales for the fourth amendment exclusionary
rule mentioned in note 24 supra. There is more in-
volved than just deterring police and giving the
public reliable evidence so that truth may be at-
tained. The balance in the criminal adversary sys-
tem between fairness to the individual and fairness
to the state is also at stake.
[Vol. 65
SUPREME COURT REVIEW (1974)
result is that a technical violation of Miranda
is now no longer viewed as sufficient to estab-
lish an infringement of the fifth amendment
because it reaches only the "prophylactic rules"
and not the constitutional right itself. While
Tucker was not concerned with the admissibil-
ity of defendant's own statements, it is a har-
binger for change in that area also. Since the
Miranda rules were held to be only prophylac-
tic, and not of constitutional stature, the tenor
of the opinion suggests that future defendants
may be required to show more than a simple
violation of Miranda to deprive the prosecutor
of the use of their own incriminating state-
ments. Regarding the issue of "fruits," the
Court limited its holding to the admission of
third party testimony derived from a pre-Mi-
randa interrogation. In considering the con-
flicting policy justifications for admission and
exclusion, the Court tipped the balance in
favor of the "pursuit of truth" and down-
graded the importance of "procedural fair-
ness." If the Court strikes this balance more
frequently in future cases, it would mark a
portentous shift in the ground rules under
which our criminal adversary system operates.
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